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Hay, Hilke, and Nelson (hereinafter Hay et al.)' provide a useful
survey, as well as some extensions, on current thinking with respect to
geographic market definition in an international context. Clearly, as the
authors recognize, foreign competition is extremely important in most
U.S. industries, and the manner in which it is taken into account in per-
forming antitrust analysis can have a dramatic impact on the legal or
policy considerations that are reached in a particular instance. Since
market power plays such a key role, the authors remind us that it is
important "to have both a proper conceptual understanding and a work-
able empirical means of identifying market power. ' ' 2 The authors believe
that the first of these is relatively straightforward, the second more diffi-
cult. We contend that neither are straightforward and that the authors
have erred with respect to how they have conceptualized market power,
at least for an important class of industries.
First, let us consider first the conceptual issues, and then the empiri-
cal. Conceptually, Hay et al. argue, following the mainstream literature,
that market power can be defined as "the ability of a firm or group of
firms' profitability to raise prices significantly above competitive levels
for a sustained period."'3 This definition, they claim, is fully consistent
with a consumer welfare orientation for antitrust.
Yet, for an important class of situations, namely, where technologi-
cal change is important, some period of market power may be required in
order to encourage and enable firms to invest in research, development,
and commercialization activities. In many circumstances, particularly
where the spillover benefits of innovation are high and imitation is easy,
the exercise of market power by producers may be consistent with en-
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hanced consumer welfare. Moreover, in markets characterized by rapid
technological progress, competition often takes place on the basis of per-
formance features and not price. Given the importance of technological
change to economic progress, and the importance of trade in high tech-
nology goods in the total international trading picture, the conceptual
approach offered by Hay et al. to the measurement of market power often
needs to be modified if consumer welfare is to be improved rather than
harmed by antitrust interventions.
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The second step is to arrive at a workable empirical means to mea-
sure market power. The authors correctly observe that the tradition in
antitrust analysis, despite the lack of an unambiguous supportive evi-
dence, has been to associate market power with market concentration. 5
Of course, it is in deciding the relevant market and in computing shares
that the most antitrust torment lies. Whether the courts believe that the
market is domestic or in some fashion global is likely to have huge impli-
cations for market share determination and for conclusions about market
power. Hence, the need to define correctly the geographic scope of the
market becomes crucial.
Hay et al. recognize that while foreign producers can affect the mar-
ket power of domestic firms even when foreign producers make no sales
in the U.S., the most obvious way thai foreign firms can limit the market
power of domestic firms is when foreign firms actually sell some or all of
their output in the U.S., or are capable of doing so if U.S. prices rise
above competitive levels. 6 The authors embark on a review of how
traditional merger analysis accounts for such foreign competition. They
point out that analysts usually decide to expand the geographic market to
include foreign production when (1) there are no significant import barri-
ers into the U.S., (2) domestic and foreign prices for the relevant product
move together, and (3) shipments into the U.S. are an actuality or a pos-
sibility. With respect to the latter, there is considerable debate as to
which foreign shipments should be included in the relevant geographic
market. Landes and Posner have argued that all foreign production
should be included. 7 Others, including Harris and Jorde, have argued
that only actual sales into the U.S. plus some portion of excess capacity
should be included.8 Hay et al. point out that whether foreign producers
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have a greater supply responsiveness than domestic firms is essentially an
empirical question that cannot be settled theoretically.9 Nevertheless,
they suggest two approaches for ascertaining whether imports limit the
market power of domestic firms. One relies upon estimating import de-
mand elasticities;' 0 the other uses historical data to explore whether ex-
change rate changes, which supposedly proxy for changes in import
prices, impact market shares. 1 Their empirical work along these lines is
quite helpful, and is the most original part of the papei. Because the
estimates obtained are generally quite low, it leads the authors to be cau-
tious with respect to incorporating foreign production or capacity in
amounts substantially greater than the actual amount of imports that
have entered the U.S.
Hay et al. have crafted a nice piece which implicitly employs the
standard microeconomic analysis of markets to address the role of for-
eign competition. However, like a good deal of other work in this tradi-
tion, it is insensitive to a number of the realities of international
competition today. For instance, in many industries it is, in our view,
important to ask what is the nature of the competition which comes from
abroad?' 2 Is competition primarily on the basis of price, or on the basis
of product performance? If it is the latter, import price elasticities may
not be all that interesting. Foreign competition may surge forward with-
out a price advantage if product innovation abroad is on a faster trajec-
tory than it is in the U.S. Also, questions of long-term corporate strategy
come into play. If foreign firms are committed to a strategy of entering
the U.S. market, as evidenced by their expenditures on market entry ac-
tivities and other factors, then one might weigh imports differently than
if they were simply taking advantage of short-term arbitrage opportuni-
ties. Also, foreign industrial policies impact the nature of competition in
the U.S., and these factors sometimes ought loom larger in market defini-
tion analysis than the best point estimates of import demand elasticities
or exchange rate elasticities. In short, because the authors' analysis is
based on a very simple market model and a very simple model of the
firm, much that is important with respect to competition never comes
into focus.
The business strategy literature, which provides many insights into
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the nature of competition and competitive responses, is not, unfortu-
nately, utilized in this paper or in the antitrust literature more generally.
When economists begin to utilize richer models of the firm and of mar-
kets, they will begin informing the courts and Congress in a meaningful
way about the competitive process. Hay et al. have made a start in at
least highlighting relevant data which might help assist one in, assessing
the strengths of competition. But the literature has a long way to go
before it can provide the foundation for an antitrust policy which effec-
tively comes to grips with the new forms of competition coming from
abroad.
